

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8190
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
EUCOM GER
USCINCEUR GER
CINCUSAFE
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 5371

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, TU
SUBJ: NEXT STEPS IF DEMIREL SHOULD FAIL

1. SUMMARY: IF JUSTICE PARTY (JP) CHAIRMAN DEMIREL FAILS IN
HIS PRESENT ATTEMPT TO FORM A THREE PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT,
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS INCLUDE A JP-NATIONALIST ACTIONALIST ACTION PARTY
(NAP) COALITION SUPPORTED FROM THE OUTSIDE BY ERBAKAN'S NATIONAL
SALVATION PARTY (NSP)(UNLIKELY), AN RPP-NSP COALITION
(GOOD POSSIBILITY), AN RPP-NAP COALITION (HIGHLY UNLIKELY), AN
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RPP-JP COALITION UNDER ECEVIT (HIGHLY UNLIKELY) OR UNDER AN
INDEPENDENT (GPPD POSSIBILITY) AND AN ABOVE PARTIES GOVERNMENT
(UNLIKELY). PRESIDENT KORUTURK WILL PLAY THE KEY ROLE IN DETERMINING
NEXT STEPS. WE EXPECT HE WILL GIVE RPP CHAIRMAN ECEVIT ANOTHER
CHANCE BEFORE HE TURNS TO AN INDEPENDENT. END SUMMARY

2. THIS TELEGRAM OUTLINES POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IF CURRENT EFFORTS

TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT AMONG THE JP, NSP, AND NAP FAIL.

3. THE MOST IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY, ALTHOUGH SLIGHT IN OUR OPINION, IS THAT JP CHAIRMAN DEMIREL COULD ACCEPT NSP CHAIRMAN ERBAKAN'S OFFER OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR A JP-NAP COALITION. DEMIREL MIGHT BE TEMPTED BY THIS OPTION SINCE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE THE ONLY REMAINING MEANS BY WHICH HE COULD BECOME PRIME MINISTER WITH THE PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY LINE-UP. A STRONG COUNTER ARGUMENT HOWEVER, WOULD BE THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD BE HOSTAGE TO A MAN WHO WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN ITS SUCCESS.

R. IF DEMIREL RETURNS TO PRESIDENT KORUTURK THE MANDATE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT, KORUTURK WOULD DECIDE WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT. (THE CONSTITUTION CHARGES THE PRESIDENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DESIGNATING THE PRIME MINISTER AND GIVES HIM ALMOST NO GUIDANCE. KORUTURK'S MOST LIKELY FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO MEET INDIVIDUALLY WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL LEADERS AND ASSESS POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR KORUTURK TO ASK SOMEONE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. ESSENTIALLY, KORUTURK WOULD HAVE TWO CHOICES--ECEVIT OR AN INDEPENDENT.

5. IF THE PRESIDENT ASKES ECEVIT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT, HE MAY GIVE HIM EITHER AN OPEN OR RESTRICTED MANDATE. ASSUMING AN UNRESTRICTED MANDATE (AND ECEVIT MIGHT REFUSE ANY OTHER KIND) ECEVIT WOULD HAVE FOUR POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT:

(A) SINGLE PARTY-- THIS IS WHAT ECEVIT TRIED AND FAILED TO DO
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EARLIER. HE MAY ARGUE THAT SINCE THE OPPOSITION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT, HE SHOULD GET A SECOND CHANCE. ECEVIT MIGHT BELIEVE THAT HE COULD PICK UP ENOUGH TRANSFERS OR STAY-AWAYS AMONG PERSONS OPPOSED TO THE PARTICIPATION OF ERBAKAN OR TURKES IN A GOVERNMENT TO WIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. WE DOUBT THAT PRESIDENT KORUTURK WOULD AGREE TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION WITHOUT PRIOR ASSURANCE

OF SUCCESS.

(B) RPP-NSP COALITION--THIS OPTION IS NUMERICALLY FEASIBLE AND MAY WELL BE WHAT NSP CHIEF ERBAKAN HAS BEEN AIMING FOR. ECEVIT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE TO ERBAKAN WOULD BE LOATHE TO SETTLE FOR LESS. ONE ADDITIONAL NEGATIVE FACTOR IS PRESIDENT KORUTURK'S ANTIPATHY TOWARD ERBAKAN WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY CAUSE HIM TO DISCOURAGE ECEVIT FROM APPROACHING ERBAKAN. NEVERTHELESS, THIS PROBABLY REPRESENTS ECEVIT'S BEST CHANCE OF FORMING A GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD WIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. HE MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO GIVE A SINGLE COALITION PARTNER A BETTER DEAL THAN DEMIREL COULD GIVE TO ONE OF TWO COALITION PARTNERS.

(C) RPP-NAP COALITION-THIS HAS BEEN DISMISSED OUT OF HAND UNTIL RECENTLY. IT HAS BEEN AN ARTICLE OF FAITH AMONG THE RPP THAT THE NAP IS FASCIST AND THAT ITS LEADER TURKES " HAS BLOOD ON HIS HANDS". ECEVIT REFUSED TO MEET WITH TURKES WHILE TRYING TO

FORM A GOVERNMENT LAST MONTH. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN A THAW IN RPP-NAP RELATIONS. TURKES HAS STATED SEVERAL TIMES HIS READINESS TO TALK TO ANYONE. ECEVIT HAS NOT GONE SO FAR, BUT HE HAS BEEN LESS OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISM. MOREOVER, SOME IN THE RPP HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN STRUCK BY THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE RPP AND NAP POSITIONS ON MANY ISSUES. ONE PRO-RPP NEWSPAPER EVEN REPORTED THAT THE RPP HAD PROPOSED A COALITION. (BOTH THE RPP AND NAP DENIED THE STORY.) SUCH A COALITION MUST STILL BE CONSIDERED A VERY OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY-- BUT IT IS NO LONGER BEYOND COMPREHENSION.

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USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR

DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 5371

(D) RPP-JP COALITION--THE IDEA OF A " GRAND COALITION" BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES IS INCREASINGLY BEING DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY HERE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT YET GAINED AS MUCH POPULARITY IN TURKEY AS IT HAS AMONG FOREIGN OBSERVERS. THE RPP RANK AND FILE IS GENERALLY BELIEVED TO BE OPPOSED TO THE IDEA. " THEY WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND OUR CONSORTING WITH THE ENEMY," ONE RPP DEPUTY

TOLD US. (SOME JP PARTISANS HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIONS BECAUSE A COALITION WITH THE RPP WOULD LESSEN THE PARTY'S APPEAL TO CONSERVATIVES.) OTHERS ARGUE THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC, WOULD RE-ESTABLISH THE " TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY" THE
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RPP SUFFERED FROM IN THE 50'S. FINALLY, MANY IN THE RPP BELIEVE THAT THE RPP DEFEAT IN THE 1965 ELECTION WAS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEN-PARTY CHAIRMAN INONU'S DECISION TO FORM A COALITION WITH THE JP IN 1961. IF ECEVIT AND THE RPP SHOULD--AS A RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS--DECIDE TO TRY AN RPP-JP COALITION, ECEVIT'S STATE PREFERENCE IS FOR HIM TO LEAD THAT COALITION. WE DOUBT THAT DEMIREL WOULD AGREE TO A COALITION WITH ECEVIT AS PRIME MINISTER. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES ECEVIT WOULD BE FORCED TO RETURN HIS MANDATE TO THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD, IN TURN, SEEK AN INDEPENDENT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT.

6. AN INDEPENDENT COULD BE ASKED TO FORM EITHER A GRAND COALITION OR AN ABOVE PARTIES GOVERNMENT.

(A) GRAND COALITION WITH AN INDEPENDENT PRIME MINISTER--(THE MOST COMMONLY MENTIONED CANDIDATE FOR THIS TASK IS ZEYYAD BAYKARA, A PRESIDENTIALLY-APPOINTED SENATOR WHO SERVED AS JUSTICE MINISTER IN THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.) PRESUMABLY, BOTH ECEVIT AND DEMIREL WOULD STEP ASIDE AND OFFER MEMBERS OF THEIR PARTIES TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT. THE BARGAINING WOULD BE INTENSE, BUT SINCE SUCH A COALITION WOULD AT THIS POINT BE CONSIDERED PERHAPS THE LAST CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED

(B) AN ABOVE PARTIES GOVERNMENT--THIS IS TOO REMINISCENT OF 1971 FOR IT TO BE CONSIDERED AS ANYTHING BUT A LAST, DESPARTE CHANCE TO SAVE THE SYSTEM. AT THIS POINT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS A LIVE OPTION.

7. IN SUMMARY, IF DEMIREL FAILS IN HIS CURRENT ATTEMPT, SEVERAL OPTIONS REMAIN. WE BELIEVE ECEVIT WILL DEMAND ANOTHER CHANCE BEFORE KORUTURK TURNS TO AN INDEPENDENT. IF HE RECEIVES THAT CHANCE, SEVERAL APPROACHES ARE POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH AN RPP-NSP COALITION STRIKES US AS THE MOST LIKELY. KORUTURK COULD PRE-EMPT ECEVIT, SINCE HE (ECEVIT) HAS PUBLICLY PROPOSED AN RPP-JP COALITION, HAS
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SAID AN INDEPENDENT PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND HAS SAID THE OFFER WILL REMAIN VALID. IF KORUTURK CHOOSES THIS ROUTE, HOWEVER, HE WILL DO SO WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT HE IS FORECLOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SEVERAL OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS AND PERHAPS FORCING THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO CHOOSE BETWEEN A GRAND COALITION

AND AN EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT THINK
HE'LL TAKE THAT APPROACH, HE MAY DECIDE TURKEY HAS WAITED LONG
ENOUGH AND TRY TO FORCE THE PACE.
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